NATO Needs to Welcome Bosnia Before It’s Too Late

In 1995, a U.S.-led military intervention ended three and a half years of war in Bosnia. Along with the European Union, the United States invested heavily in peace-building. Now, pro-Russian actors threaten to derail the country’s future with Western institutions by preventing its accession to NATO. Earlier this month, Russia’s ambassador to Bosnia made a veiled threat to the country in case it decided to proceed with NATO membership. The window of opportunity for the United States and NATO to act, and welcome Bosnia to the alliance, is still open—but it may be starting to close. Amid the war in Ukraine, it is time to seize the momentum and expand NATO to include Bosnia.

It was a NATO-led mission that successfully implemented the military aspects of the Dayton Accords, ending the carnage of war, from late 1995 to 2004. The 60,000-strong force was a major reason the country did not slide back into conflict. In fact, NATO is generally credited with ensuring much-needed security in postwar Bosnia.

For decades now, joining the EU and NATO have been Bosnia’s top strategic objectives, though NATO is incomparably more important. The country’s recent history, marked by internal secession and external interference from neighboring Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, is a constant reminder of the necessity of acquiring a security umbrella.

In 1995, a U.S.-led military intervention ended three and a half years of war in Bosnia. Along with the European Union, the United States invested heavily in peace-building. Now, pro-Russian actors threaten to derail the country’s future with Western institutions by preventing its accession to NATO. Earlier this month, Russia’s ambassador to Bosnia made a veiled threat to the country in case it decided to proceed with NATO membership. The window of opportunity for the United States and NATO to act, and welcome Bosnia to the alliance, is still open—but it may be starting to close. Amid the war in Ukraine, it is time to seize the momentum and expand NATO to include Bosnia.

It was a NATO-led mission that successfully implemented the military aspects of the Dayton Accords, ending the carnage of war, from late 1995 to 2004. The 60,000-strong force was a major reason the country did not slide back into conflict. In fact, NATO is generally credited with ensuring much-needed security in postwar Bosnia.

For decades now, joining the EU and NATO have been Bosnia’s top strategic objectives, though NATO is incomparably more important. The country’s recent history, marked by internal secession and external interference from neighboring Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, is a constant reminder of the necessity of acquiring a security umbrella.

Bosnia’s decision on NATO membership was clearly laid out in 2005 when the Law on Defense was adopted. Article 84 of this law states that all state-level institutions including the presidency, the state-level government, and the state-level parliament will work toward achieving full membership in NATO.

By undermining Bosnia’s functioning, though, anti-NATO forces are working to ensure that the country remains fragile and fails to meet requirements for full membership in the alliance. They are aided in this mission of sabotage by the country’s political system—one of the most complex in the world, for a population of less than 3 million.

Bosnia has multiple levels of governance: the state level, entities, cantons, and municipalities. As a result of the complex power-sharing agreement, there are a series of built-in institutional vetoes that hamper efficient decision-making. For a country with a rapidly declining population, Bosnia has an extraordinary number of politicians: three co-presidents, 14 parliaments, more than 130 ministers, and at least 70 political parties.

This Byzantine system means that it takes months to form governments at different levels across the country. Around 10 major political parties in the country are both in power and in opposition simultaneously at different levels of governance. This, along with ethnic-based politics and vetoes, effectively impedes change.

Bosnia has faced institutional gridlock, secessionism, rampant corruption, and external meddling in what has turned out to be a decade and a half of prolonged instability. Thousands of Bosnians are voting with their feet in search of a brighter future elsewhere in Europe. Towns and villages across the country are eerily deserted as the outward migration takes a staggering toll.

In the lead-up to elections last October, a number of political parties branded themselves as reformist, promising major changes in a country where ethnic affiliations dominate. When the new state-level government was finally formed in late January, international diplomats based in Sarajevo welcomed this as a sign of much-needed change. The U.S. Embassy voiced its support and offered to assist in “reforms required for BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration,” and the EU expressed its enthusiasm.

In fact, both change and the country’s pro-Western course are now in doubt.

At the state level, two hard-line parties that have dominated the country’s politics remain in power: the Bosnian Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). A coalition document signed before the new government took office ominously left out Bosnia’s objective of joining NATO. There is a reference to the country’s ambition to join the EU, but not the military alliance.

In the highly autonomous Republika Srpska, which makes up 49 percent of the country’s territory, an anti-NATO constituency has emerged. When NATO had boots on the ground, until 2004, there was little open anti-Western sentiment. The Americans’ turn away from the Balkans—and the departure of U.S. troops in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—left a power vacuum in the country. A new EU-led force in Bosnia turned out to be no more than a paper tiger.

While the EU’s approach to Bosnia was hapless, Russia’s assertiveness across Europe over the past decade has been felt, especially in Bosnia. Back in 2009, Bosnia’s Serb member of the presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic, was in favor of Bosnia’s aspiration to join NATO. Now, the leader of SNSD, Milorad Dodik, is at the forefront of anti-NATO sentiment. Once a nominal social democrat praised by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Dodik has been in power since 2006 and has firmly entrenched himself as the dominant figure in Republika Srpska. For the past 17 years, he has worked assiduously to undermine Bosnia’s state-level institutions. In response, the United States imposed sanctions on Dodik in 2017, but to little effect. Targeted sanctions by the United Kingdom last year were similarly ineffective.

Dodik has for years cultivated close links with Moscow. He supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and visited President Vladimir Putin twice last year. Dodik has positioned himself as the Russian president’s most loyal ally in this part of Europe. In early January, the Bosnian Serb leader awarded Republika Srpska’s highest medal of honor to Putin. This was a direct poke in the eye to the West.

As he provokes the West with no consequences, his and his allies’ pro-Russian sentiments are on full display. After NATO defence ministers pledged to step up their support for Bosnia, Georgia and Moldova in mid-February, Dodik came out against this assistance. As Ukraine prepares to mark the first anniversary of the Russian invasion, Republika Srpska parliament speaker and Dodik ally Nenad Stevandic is on an official visit to Moscow this week.

Apart from Dodik, another influential actor in the new government is the leader of the HDZ, Dragan Covic. Both Dodik and Covic are veterans of Bosnia’s political scene and have a rock-solid alliance. Unlike Dodik, Covic is not on the record as being opposed to NATO. But he has been airing pro-Russian views over the last few years.

Back in 2017, Bosnian-American scholar Jasmin Mujanovic was the first to point out Covic’s and HDZ’s pro-Russian sentiments. In 2020, Covic declared that there “there is very little Russian influence here.” Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Covic and a few fellow HDZ members voted against Bosnia joining EU sanctions on Russia.

There are broader consequences to pro-Russian actors fostering instability in this corner of Europe. A destabilization of Bosnia could easily spill over into next-door NATO member states Croatia and Montenegro. Bosnia’s 12-mile shoreline is the only non-NATO territory on the Adriatic Sea. With pro-Russian politicians also influential in Montenegro, Russia is set to gain access to the warm waters. This means two countries that were once both pro-Western have become contested between the West and Russia. A worst-case scenario mulled by some analysts is the opening of a new front in the Balkans to distract from the war in Ukraine.

Sarajevo is an hour’s flight from Vienna, and in the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees made their way to Western Europe. Investing in Bosnia’s security is a direct investment in Europe’s security.

If Bosnia’s NATO integration is stalled—as is expected—the message for the United States and its allies in NATO is clear: Admit Bosnia into NATO before it is too late.

The good news is that despite Bosnia’s changing electoral politics, polls show NATO is still broadly popular. A survey conducted by the International Republican Institute last year found that 69 percent of Bosniaks and 77 percent of Croats support NATO membership.

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg support for Bosnia and has stated that the country is on a path to membership. The alliance is implementing the Membership Action Plan for Bosnia, which is a stepping stone to accession to NATO. But time is of the essence. A narrow focus on Bosnia meeting requirements for NATO membership should give way to the larger objective of securing this corner of Europe.

NATO’s history includes several cases of strategic enlargement. In 1952, Greece became a member following the Greek Civil War. West Germany was admitted in 1955 while under U.S. tutelage. Spain joined NATO in 1982, several years after the Franco dictatorship ended. In these cases, democratic development took a back seat to strategic imperatives. The same should be the case today for Bosnia. Unless Bosnia is admitted quickly, a Russian outpost in what should have been NATO territory could be the new reality.

His response, based on the linked source, seems more neutral. He said NATO would respect Bosnia’s choice to join or not.